Newton’s Experimentum Crucis vs. Goethe’s Series of Experiments: Implications for the Underdetermination Thesis by Marcum, James
Newton’s Experimentum Crucis vs. Goethe’s Series of Experiments: 
Implications for the Underdetermination Thesis

James A. Marcum
Baylor University, TX, USA

	In the seventeenth century Isaac Newton conducted experiments to determine the nature of light.  These experiments were reported in a letter read, in Newton’s absence, at the Royal Society in London and published in its Philosophical Transactions.  Newton concluded that “Light consists of Rays differently refrangible” (1671/2, p. 3079).  The conclusion, he claimed, is established on a single experiment, an experimentum crucis, as he called it.  Importantly the crucial experiment permitted Newton to distinguish his theory of light, as well as his theory of color, from competing theories—such as Descartes’ notion of light as rotating globules.  And, it formed at that time an important component of his experimental philosophy.
	In the eighteenth century, in a critique of Newton’s theory of light and color—particularly based on the experimentum crucis—Johann Goethe claimed that Newton’s theory was an artificial construct of the human intellect and not derived from nature itself.  The result of Newton’s artificial method, argued Goethe, was a distorted view of nature.  In contrast, Goethe devised and conducted a series of optical experiments, in which he altered systematically the experimental conditions, in order to understand the nature of color.  The result of these experiments was evidence of a higher sort that mediated between the observer’s theory and the observed and allowed the phenomenon to be understood in a holistic fashion.
	In this paper, I examine the difference between Newton’s and Goethe’s approaches to investigating the nature of light and color.  I first discuss Newton’s famous experimentum crucis, as well as his experimental philosophy.  I next discuss Goethe’s experiments on the nature of color, especially in contradistinction to Newton, as well as his methodological principle formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler.”  I then propose that Newton’s justification of his theory of light and color is best reconstructed in terms of Goethe’s methodological principle rather than in terms of a crucial experiment.   I finally conclude the paper with a discussion of the consequences of Goethe’s principle for the contemporary philosophical underdetermination thesis.

Newton’s experimentum crucis
	In a letter to the Royal Society, Newton reported an experimentum crucis in which he took one board with a small hole and placed it behind a prism, which received sunlight from a small hole in the window shutter of a darkened room.  A second board with another small hole was placed 12 feet from the first board, so that a portion of the incident light would pass through the hole of the second board.  A second prism was placed behind the hole of the second board, which then further dispersed the light onto a nearby wall.  By slowly rotating the first prism about its axis, Newton was able to make different sections of the initial image pass through the hole in the second board and then observe where it fell on the wall.  What he found was that the part of the initial image—an oblong image composed of a spectrum of individual colors—that was refracted least (i.e. red) by the first prism was also refracted least by the second prism compared to that part of the initial image refracted the greatest (i.e. blue).  From these results, Newton concluded that “Light itself is a Heterogeneous mixture of differently refrangible Rays” (1671/2, p. 3079).  He went on in the second part of the letter to outline his “doctrine of colours,” based on his theory of light, in which the various spectral colors exhibited different “degrees of Refrangibility.”
	Traditionally, especially since Ernst Mach, Newton’s experimental philosophy or methodology has been reconstructed in positivistic terms.  As such, Newton’s method was inductive in nature and depended on what he called analysis. “Analysis,” as Newton defined it methodologically, “consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths” (1730/1959, p. 404).  According to Newton, the optical crucial experiment was sufficient to demonstrate his theory of light and formed, at this time, the cornerstone of his experimental philosophy.  What made the crucial experiment compelling for Newton was what he called its “weight,” in clearly or directly demonstrating the optical phenomenon and supporting his interpretation of it. 

Goethe’s work on color and critique of Newton
	Goethe’s interest in the nature of color began with his Italian journey from 1786-1788.  While there, he was struck by the inability of artists to account for the use of colors in a systematic manner.  After returning to Weimar, he consulted the scientific compendia on the nature of color in which he came across Newton’s prism experiments. These experiments provoked his interest in color theory.  He then conducted an extended series of experiments to investigate the nature of color, which was subsequently published in Beiträge zur Optik and also in Zur Farbenlehre.
	In the Beiträge, Goethe reported optical experiments to determine the conditions under which colors emerge.  He was systematic in his experimentation, beginning with preliminary experiments in which he viewed objects, such as a white piece of paper, a blank wall, or a blue sky, through a prism.  Observation of a white piece of paper, for example, did not yield—as Goethe expected—a color spectrum in terms of Newton’s theory of light and color, unless a contrasting feature, such as an irregularity, was present on the paper.  Under these conditions, he observed colors at the contrasting boundary through a prism in which various colors of Newton’s spectrum were perceptible.  These experiments initially led Goethe to reject Newton’s theory of color and to search for and to propose eventually an alternative theory, through subsequent experimentation.
	In an ensuing experiment, Goethe viewed through a prism a white piece of paper with black squiggly lines.  He observed colors that clung to the lines.  Next, he viewed a rectangular piece of white paper on a black background.  What he observed through a prism was a spectrum of colors, with red at the top followed by yellow, green, blue, and then violet at the bottom.  He next inverted the arrangement, with a black rectangle on a white background, and observed through a prism another spectrum of colors, with blue at the top followed by violet, magenta, red, and then yellow at the bottom.  Goethe then conducted experiments with a white card painted half black and viewed it through a prism.  With the black part above the white, he observed a red and yellow band in between the black and white boundary.  With the card inverted, he observed a blue and violet band.  Next, he conducted several more experiments in which he varied the image, such as a checkerboard arrangement of black and white squares, and observed the colors.
	From the results of this series of experiments, Goethe derived several rules or principles. One of the chief rules was that color is not generated in a prism upon viewing uniform or “pure” surfaces; rather, a contrasting boundary is critical for color appearance.  The boundary is necessary, according to Goethe, because that is where light and darkness meet, with some colors radiating toward the light and others toward the darkness.  Goethe accounted for his findings in terms of boundary modificationism.   Moreover, these rules and principles were not simply summaries of Goethe’s experiments but acted heuristically to guide future research, which bore fruit in Zur Farbenlehre.
	In Zur Farbenlehre—particularly in the didactic part—Goethe divided colors into a variety of categories, including physiological and pathological colors, physical colors, and chemical colors.  The physical colors were further divided into catoptric, paroptic, dioptric, and epoptic colors, depending on how the colors where generated.  Of special interest are the dioptric colors, which emerge from light passing through a translucent body, such as a prism or turbid medium. The dioptric colors were further divided into first and second classes, with the first class emerging from light traversing a turbid medium and the second, which represents a special class of the first class, emerging from boundary contrast upon viewing through a prism.
	To substantiate first-class dioptric colors, Goethe performed a variety of experiments.  For example, starlight viewed through a slightly turbid medium appears yellow while as the turbidity of the medium increases the light ultimately appears red.  Although Goethe acknowledged that these experiments are subjective in nature, he identified several objective phenomena, such as viewing the sun at different positions in the sky (e.g. yellow at noon and red at sunrise or sunset), which supported the notion that the emergence of colors depends upon the turbidity through which light is viewed.  In conclusion, Goethe accounted for his findings in terms of medium modificationism.   
	In a well known essay “Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt,” Goethe defended his optical experiments and his scientific methodology.  He argued that experiments act as mediators between the objective and the subjective, to bridge the gap between ideas about a natural object and the object itself.  As mediators, experiments are the means natural philosophers often use to navigate between how they think nature functions as articulated in their theories and hypotheses (i.e. the subjective) and how nature actually functions (i.e. the objective).  
	Goethe also argued that no single experiment mediates completely or sufficiently between objective nature and one’s subjective experience of it, because entities and forces are intimately connected and affect one another.  This interconnection of natural phenomena was causal for Goethe and formed the foundation for his holistic approach to the study of nature.  The problem, as Goethe saw it, was how to determine the link between these phenomena.
	Based on this holistic approach, Goethe proposed the notion of “series of experiments” as mediator.  According to Goethe, an experimental series is “a series of contiguous experiments derived from one another” (1988, p. 16).  In other words, the experimental outcome of one experiment or set of experiments implies the undertaking of another experiment or set.  Through sequential experimental suggestions, a series of experiments is composed of linked or connected experiments and thereby acts as a mediator to link or connect a scientific theory and hypothesis about natural phenomena with the experience of those phenomena.
	Goethe’s preliminary prism experiment, as reported in the Beiträge zur Optik and later in Zur Farbenlehre, yielded colors at a boundary between light and darkness that suggested the generation of color is the result of the modification of light at a boundary.  He next performed a set of boundary prism experiments that substantiated this suggestion.  However, his experiments also suggested that the medium through which the light passed or is viewed is also responsible for the color generation.  Subsequent experimentation reported in Zur Farbenlehre, in terms of subjective and objective dioptric experiments, supported this experimental suggestion. The derivation of these experiments through their experimental suggestions formed a united experiment for linking nature (i.e. objective) and theory or hypothesis (i.e. subjective).




	Goethe was highly critical of Newton’s theory of light and color, especially Newton’s reliance on seemingly one or only several experiments to prove his theory.  In the “Der Versuch als Vermittler” essay, with Newton in his sights, Goethe claimed that little, if anything, could be proved through a single experiment or even a set of experiments.  However, analysis of Newton’s experiments reported in the Philosophical Transactions letter reveals that his experiments on the nature of light and color also formed or may be reconstructed as a series of experiments—although a limited or focused series—with the generation of higher empirical evidence.  Indeed, the development and justification of Newton’s theory depended on a series of experiments, in which each experiment generally led to or made way for the next, and on the evidence obtained from them.  In this respect, the crucial experiment is one among many in Newton’s attempt to justify his theory.
	In the first of the optical lectures Newton described a prism experiment that resulted in the oblong spectrum, as a “commonly encountered experiment” (1984, pp. 51, 285).  It was also the first experiment described in the letter to the Royal Society, even though the experiment is not the first experiment chronologically as evident from his notebooks. In the experiment, Newton made a small hole in the window shutter and allowed light to pass through a prism at the minimum deviation position, i.e. the position at which the angle of the light beam before and after passing through the prism is the same.  What Newton observed on an opposite wall from the shutter was not the expected circular image, as predicted from the law of refraction, but an oblong image in which its length was five times greater than its breadth.  Newton considered the “disproportion so extravagant, that it excited me to a more then ordinary curiosity of examining, from whence it might proceed” (1671/2, p. 3076). 
	Newton’s initial experiment generated a problem that he investigated in subsequent experiments, which formed an experimental set reported in the letter.  That set was concerned with eliminating a number of technical and theoretical possibilities that could account for the oblong spectrum.  The first experiment was designed to explore the possibility that the observation of an oblong image instead of a circle is the result of the thickness of the prism.  It was known that the prismatic image could be altered if the light passed through the prism’s vertex as opposed to its base.  To test this possibility Newton allowed the light to pass through different parts of the prism, with varying thickness.  He still observed the original oblong image.
	Newton designed the next experiment to test whether the oblong colored spectrum was due to the unevenness or some other irregularity of the prism itself.  Utilizing a second prism, he positioned it in an inverted manner so that it refracted the light from the first prism in a “contrary way.”  Newton’s reasoning was that if the dispersion of the light or the dilation of the colors was due to an irregularity of the prism then a second prism would compound the effect.  If not, then the second prism should neutralize the effect of the first prism.  What Newton observed was an “orbicular” shape or a circle, comparable to the shape of the light before passing through a prism.  
	In the next set of experiments, Newton examined whether the oblong colored spectrum is the result of what Newton called the “termination with shadow or darkness.”  In terms of the traditional modificationist theory, color was thought to be the outcome of mixing light and darkness, with the darkness being supplied by the boundary of the hole in the window shutter.  To test this possibility, Newton conducted two experiments.  The first was to vary the hole’s diameter, in the window shutter.  The second was to place the prism in front of the window shutter hole.  According to Newton, varying these conditions was immaterial to his original observation of an oblong image.    
	After exhausting what Newton considered to be the technical and theoretical possibilities for explaining the oblong colored image, he then introduced an experiment that he claimed supports an alternative interpretation of the data.  Newton’s crucial experiment is traditionally considered the culmination of his experimental evidence justifying his theory of light, as composed of rays with different refrangibilities.  Newton himself initially considered it as providing the necessary evidence for the theory.  However, I contend that its weight is not a result of the experiment per se; rather, that weight is provided only through the previous experiments that eliminated rival hypotheses or explanations and technical problems for accounting for the nature of light.  Newton’s experiment is crucial only because of that context.  Without it, it provides only anomalous evidence.  Moreover, according to his critics, on its own it was inadequate for justifying his theory of light.
	Although Newton considered the experimentum crucis critical for establishing his theory of light, he did not consider it adequate for justifying his theory of color.  Rather, in his letter to the Royal Society Newton reported two additional experiments—taken from another set of experiments—in defense of the theory.  In the first reported experiment he took a prism and placed it next to a small hole in the window shutter of a darkened room, he then placed a focusing lens four to five feet from the prism.  Newton next took a white sheet of paper and placed it ten to twelve feet from the lens.  What he observed on the paper was a colored oblong spectrum proximal to the lens and an inverted spectrum distal to it, along with a white spot at an intermediate position to the two spectra.  In the second experiment, the prism was placed endwise.  With this experiment he was unable to refract further “uncompounded” colors.  From these experiments, Newton concluded that colored rays exhibit unique refrangibility.  
	The justification of Newton’s theory of light and color, then, was the consequence of accumulated evidence from an experimental series and not from a single crucial experiment.  That series consisted of consecutive experiments or sets of experiments connected in terms of experimental suggestions.  First, the common prism experiment represented the problem that Newton wanted to solve—the oblong rather than orbicular image from refraction of sunlight through a prism, at the position of minimum deviation.  This experiment suggested that other experiments could be designed and conducted to test whether contemporary hypotheses on the nature of light or technical problems could account for his experimental result.  However, these experiments did not account for Newton’s observation.
	Through the outcomes of the above experiments, Newton claimed he was then “led” to the suggestion that sunlight is composed of rays with different refrangibilities.  This he then tested with the experimentum crucis, which in turn supported his notion of the nature of light and suggested that the different color rays differ in terms of their refrangibilities.  To test this notion about the nature of color he designed and conducted the prism-lens experiment, among other experiments, which substantiated his theory of color.  In all, the experimental series provided the necessary evidence, according to Newton, to support his theory of light and color vis-à-vis competing theories and technical problems.

Underdetermination thesis
	I argue that Goethe’s methodological notion formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler,” in terms of experimental series and of higher empirical evidence, has important implications for the contemporary philosophical underdetermination thesis.  Briefly, proponents of the thesis claim that experimental evidence is inadequate to choose among competing theories, i.e. empirical evidence does not determine but rather underdetermines scientific theories.  Mary Hesse distinguishes two versions of the thesis.  The first is the strong version: “For any given theory T, which is acceptable on the basis of some body of evidence E, there is at least one other incompatible and acceptable theory T', which is empirically equivalent to T” (Hesse, 1981, p. 5).  In other words, the empirical evidence supports different theories equally and does not support any one theory unequivocally—at least in principle.
	Hesse’s second version of the underdetermination thesis is weaker than the first: “At any given time, there are always alternative theories such that (a) they are given some degree of support by available evidence, and (b) they imply incompatible real worlds” (1981, p. 9).  In other words, the empirical support for each of the competing theories varies but no one theory is privileged with respect to others, in terms of the experimental evidence.  Importantly, the weak version—along with the strong version—assumes that empirical evidence is unproblematic, i.e. the evidence is uniform or homogeneous.  However, there is an alternative interpretation of empirical evidence, with respect to the underdetermination thesis.  
	Empirical evidence can support—to diverse degrees—competing theories because portions of that evidence, or completely different evidence not accepted by all, support each of the competing theories dissimilarly.  Although some of the evidence is shared by competing theories, the overall evidence is not quite the same evidence for each of the competing theories.  Rather, there is generally significant development of empirical evidence as scientists vary the type and increase the number of experiments performed to choose or substantiate a theory.  For example, evidence utilized to support a particular theory may be dismissed in support of an alternative theory, while the alternative theory may draw on different evidence or emphasize the available or shared evidence differently.  In other words, not all of the theories are empirically equivalent since not all of the evidence is used to support every theory equally.  Basically, the experimental evidence must be severely limited to sustain the underdetermination thesis.
	Goethe’s methodological notion formulated in “Der Versuch als Vermittler” supports the above conclusion.  For Goethe, the evidence forms a unity that depends on the structure of the experimental series and the links between experiments within the series.  For example, Newton and Goethe constructed and conducted very different experimental series to investigate the nature of light and color.  In their respective series, the experiments were ordered differently and some experiments appeared in one series and not in another or were emphasized differently.  Thus, each theory is supported by a different series of experiments with different higher empirical evidence.  
	Finally, it is interesting to note that Newton’s theory of light and color was accepted by the scientific community based on an experimental series (and according to some, not just a single crucial experiment), while that community rejected Goethe’s theory even though he performed a series of experiments.  Why?  I propose that the reason, in part, involves the type of series Goethe conducted, with respect to the link between experiments.  The link or connection between experiments or set of experiments can be either empirical or rational. For the empirical link experiments are varied systematically in terms of experimental design or configuration, with little or even at times no theoretical or rational considerations, while for the rational link such theoretical considerations are important.  Goethe’s link was mostly empirical in nature, while Newton’s was rational or theoretical.  Because of this difference in linkage, I propose that Newton’s higher evidence from his series was more convincing to the scientific community than Goethe’s.  

6. Conclusion
 	Although Newton relied in the Philosophical Transactions paper on an experimentum crucis to justify, especially for rhetorical purposes, his theory of light as composed of different refrangible rays, I propose that justification of his theory of light and color is best reconstructed in terms of Goethe’s methodological principle of experimental series and higher empirical evidence. Certainly, Goethe is correct in claiming that “the greatest accomplishments come from those who never tire in exploring and working out every possible aspect and modification of every bit of empirical evidence, every experiment” (1998, p. 15).  However, only when experiments are linked coherently with accepted rational and theoretical considerations can scientists then choose with confidence, although only provisionally, a theory from among its competitors.  
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